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LOCALISING ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: THE LE SUEUR  CASE 
T HUMBY∗ 
1 Introduction  
In the matter of Le Sueur v Ethekwini Municipality,1 Gyanda J considered a challenge 
launched by a private property owner2 against the Ethekwini Municipality (the 
municipality) in respect of certain amendments introduced by the municipality to the 
Ethekwini Town Planning Scheme. The amendments included upgrading the legal 
status of the Durban Municipality Open Space Systems (D-MOSS), a management 
plan for the protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services in and around the 
municipal area. Formerly a policy directive, the D-MOSS identifies a viable network of 
open spaces, comprising some 74 000 ha of land and water and incorporating areas 
of high biodiversity.3 The D-MOSS extends over both public and privately owned land 
and cements an additional layer of regulation for areas included in the system. For 
private property owners, the primary implication is that notwithstanding the 
underlying zoning, development on land included within D-MOSS may not take place 
∗  Tracy-Lynn Humby. BMus (UPE), BProc, LLB LLM (UNISA) PgDip Tertiary Education (Wits) PhD 
(Wits). Associate Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand. Email: Tracy-
Lynn.Field@wits.ac.za. The research for this note was supported by funding provided by the 
Department of Science and Technology under the Urban Resilience Assessment for the Gauteng 
City Region project based in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, in cooperation with the Gauteng City Region Observatory. 
1  Le Sueur v Ethekwini Municipality [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (henceforth "Le Sueur (KZP)").  
2  RA Le Sueur also launched the application in his nomine officio capacity as trustee of a trust. 
3  Ethekwini Municipality date unknown http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/development_ 
planning_management/environmental_planning_climate_protection/Durban_Open_Space/Pages/
-What-is-the-Durban-Metropolitan-Open-Space-System.aspx. The municipality maintains that the 
D-MOSS contributes to the attainment of national and provincial biodiversity targets. Specific 
threatened ecosystems and species protected by the D-MOSS include the endangered Sandstone 
Sourveld grasslands, the critically endangered Brachystelma natalense (a small herbaceous plant 
endemic to South Africa the habitat of which has been systematically destroyed by urban 
expansion, crop cultivation and overgrazing), and the endangered Oribi, Spotted Ground Thrush, 
and Pickersgill's Reed Frog. Identified ecosystem goods and services provided by this system of 
open spaces to the residents of Durban include "the formation of soil, erosion control, water 
supply and regulation, climate regulation, cultural and recreational opportunities, raw materials 
for craft and building, food production, pollination, nutrient cycling and waste treatment". 
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without an environmental authorisation or support from the Environmental Planning 
and Climate Protection Department of the municipality.4 
One of the grounds on which Le Sueur attacked the municipality's incorporation of 
the D-MOSS as an overlay to the Ethekwini Town Planning Scheme was that the 
municipality lacked authority in terms of either the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) or in terms of any other law of general application 
to legislate on environmental issues.5 In a groundbreaking judgment, Gyanda J 
dismissed this argument, holding that municipalities do in fact have power to 
legislate on environmental matters such as biodiversity and conservation. 
After outlining the facts and judgment in this case pertaining to the local authority's 
constitutional mandate to legislate on environmental issues, this note aims to 
contextualize the Le Sueur decision in terms of the principles relating to municipal 
governance previously articulated by the Constitutional Court in City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal6 and 
Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town.7 It then goes on to situate this particular 
judgment within the emerging frame of social-ecological resilience. 
2 The judgment  
The D-MOSS was introduced as an overlay to the Ethekwini Municipality Town 
Planning Scheme in order to resolve the legal uncertainty that arose from its 
previous status as a policy directive.8 The municipality advertised a general scheme 
4  Ethekwini Municipality date unknown http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/development_ 
planning_management/environmental_planning_climate_protection/Durban_Open_Space/Pages/
MOSS_FAQ.aspx. 
5  The applicant in this matter also argued that the introduction of the D-MOSS amendments was 
also unconstitutional in that the resolution to introduce the D-MOSS had been taken in terms of 
repealed legislation – specifically, the Natal Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1947, which at the 
time that the resolution was taken had already been repealed and replaced by the KwaZulu-
Natal Planning and Development Act 6 of 2008 (PDA). The applicant further argued that the 
resolution was not saved by the transitional provisions of the latter Act. This note does not 
canvass or critique these aspects of the matter.  
6  Johannesburg Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 2 SA 554 (SCA) (henceforth 
"Gauteng Development Tribunal (CC)").  
7  Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC) (henceforth "Maccsand (CC)").  
8  Ethekwini Municipality date unknown http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/development_ 
 planning_management/environmental_planning_climate_protection/Durban_Open_Space/Pages/
MOSS_FAQ.aspx. 
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amendment in the press on a number of occasions in 2009. It held a number of 
public meetings throughout the city and served notice by post on some 18,000 
landowners.9 After carefully analysing and considering the comments received, the 
municipality formally adopted the resolution to integrate the D-MOSS into the 
existing town planning scheme as a control area or overlap on 9 December 2010.10 
2.1 The arguments 
Apart from maintaining that the municipality had not taken a "resolution" to 
integrate the D-MOSS into the town planning scheme prior to the advertisement of 
the general scheme amendment, the applicants argued that the municipality had no 
power to legislate in the functional area of the environment.11 
In as much as the amendments to the town planning scheme were legislative 
instruments, the applicants proceeded, they were unconstitutional and illegal 
because Schedule 4, Part A of the Constitution identifies "environment" as a 
functional area of concurrent national and provincial legislative and executive 
competence, thus excluding the local sphere of government from legislating or 
exercising executive authority in this area, except by way of legislative assignment.12 
The functions of the national and provincial environmental authorities are distinct 
and different from those of municipalities, the applicants held. Notwithstanding that 
the Constitution identifies as one of the objects of local government the promotion 
of a "safe and healthy environment",13 municipalities have no authority to legislate in 
respect of matters such as "environment", "nature conservation" or "biodiversity 
protection". The applicants pointed out that a municipality has executive authority 
and the right to administer only those matters set out in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 
9  Ethekwini Municipality date unknown http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/ 
development_planning_management/environmental_planning_climate_protection/Durban_Open
_Space/Pages/MOSS_FAQ.aspx. 
10  Ethekwini Municipality date unknown http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/development_ 
planning_management/environmental_planning_climate_protection/Durban_Open_Space/Pages/
MOSS_FAQ.aspx. 
11  Le Sueur (KZP) para 4(b).  
12  Le Sueur (KZP) para 16.  
13  S 152(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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5 respectively.14 This in turn also restricted the scope of its authority to make by-
laws.15 In the Gauteng Development Tribunal case the Constitutional Court had 
"decreed" that municipalities hold the functional power of "municipal planning"16 to 
the exclusion of other spheres of government, and in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment in the same matter the court had affirmed that "municipal planning" 
entails "the control and regulation of land use at a municipal level, the zoning of land 
and establishment of townships".17 The environmental aspects of both municipal 
planning, and the meaning of "safe and healthy environment" in s 152(1)(d) of the 
Constitution could be determined by having regard to the other functional areas 
listed in Parts B of the Schedules such as air pollution, storm water management 
services, water and sanitation services, and refuse removal, amongst others.18 
While the Constitution affords municipalities executive authority in respect of any 
other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation,19 the applicants 
pointed out that the National Environmental Management Act20 made no reference to 
municipalities exercising authority over environmental impact procedures, thus 
supporting the claim that environment, biodiversity protection and nature 
conservation remained the exclusive preserve of the national and provincial spheres 
of government.21 
The municipality (the first respondent) together with the KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Co-
operative Governance and Traditional Affairs opposed the application and the 
applicants' interpretation of local authorities' power in respect of the environment as 
unduly narrow and incorrect.22 The City of Cape Town, admitted by the court as an 
amicus curiae, led evidence substantially in support of the municipality.23 The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and the KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Agriculture and 
14  S 156(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
15  S 156(2) of the Constitution provides that "[a] municipality may make and administer by-laws for 
the effective administration of the matters which it has the right to administer". 
16  Located in Part B of Schedule 4 to the Constitution.  
17  Le Sueur (KZP) para 16. 
18  Le Sueur (KZP) para 16.  
19  Section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
20  National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA).  
21  Le Sueur (KZP) para 16.  
22  Le Sueur (KZP) paras 2, 19.  
23  Le Sueur (KZP) para 2.  
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Environmental Affairs had filed notices indicating their intention to abide by the 
decision of the court, a stance that the court interpreted in favour of the first and 
fourth respondents.24 
The applicants additionally maintained that insofar as the introduction of the D-
MOSS amendments had not provided for any form of compensation to landowners, 
they amounted to an unconstitutional "expropriation by stealth". However, this 
argument had only been raised in reply and was thus ignored by the court as the 
impermissible submission of a new matter.25 
2.2 Judgment and reasons for judgment  
Gyanda J roundly dismissed the applicants' arguments, holding that municipalities 
are in fact authorised to legislate in respect of environmental matters in order to 
protect the environment at the local level.26 This power to legislate, the judge held, 
in no way transgressed or intruded upon the "exclusive purview" of national and 
provincial governance in respect of environmental legislation.27 This conclusion was 
based on an elaborate argument that can be dissected in terms of five distinct, yet 
interlocking and mutually supporting themes, namely: (1) state obligations imposed 
by the right to environment in s 24 of the Constitution; (2) the scope of municipal 
executive and legislative power in terms of s 156 of the Constitution; (3) the 
constitutional model of co-operative governance; (4) the meaning of "municipal 
planning"; and (5) national and provincial support for local environmental 
governance. A brief summary of the judge's deliberation in respect of each of these 
themes follows. 
2.2.1 State obligations in terms of s 24 
Gyanda J framed his consideration of the municipal power to legislate on the 
environment in terms of the Bill of Rights and specifically, the constitutional 
24  Le Sueur (KZP) para 2.  
25  Le Sueur (KZP) para 17.  
26  Le Sueur (KZP) para 40.  
27  Le Sueur (KZP) para 40.  
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injunction upon the state to protect, promote and fulfill constitutional rights.28 Since 
the government of the Republic is constituted as national, provincial and local 
spheres of government,29 the "state" in this regard clearly includes local government 
in the form of the municipality. The functional areas of competence in Schedules 4 
and 5 are further not exhaustive of the ambit of the state's duties and must be read, 
the judge implied, in conjunction with the Bill of Rights and s 24 in particular.30 
There was nothing in s 24 to suggest that the obligation to promote ecologically 
sustainable development, or to promote conservation, is binding only upon the 
national and provincial spheres of government.31 These protections are binding also 
upon a municipality when it exercises its powers and performs its functions as 
delineated in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5 or gives effect to the obligation to 
promote a "safe and healthy environment" in s 152(1)(d). The judge then went on 
to quote from the first certification judgment,32 in which the Constitutional Court had 
observed that at a very minimum socio-economic rights must be negatively 
protected from improper invasion.33 Gyanda J did not elaborate on this line of 
thought, but he could have meant either that municipalities must exercise their 
powers with restraint, in a manner that does not invade s 24 rights, or that 
municipalities must act in a manner that protects such rights against improper 
invasion from third parties. 
2.2.2 Municipalities' legislative powers in terms of s 156 
It was within the context of s 24, the judge held, that the meaning of "municipal 
planning" in Part B of Schedule 4 needed to be assessed and interpreted. Before 
delving into the more extended meaning of this term, however, the judge turned to 
28  Le Sueur (KZP) para 19. 
29  S 40 of the Constitution.  
30  After providing that everyone has a right to an environment not harmful to health or well-being, 
s 24 of the Constitution goes on to state that "everyone has the right to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and 
other mechanisms that (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote 
conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development". 
31  Le Sueur (KZP) para 19.  
32  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 78.  
33  Le Sueur (KZP) para 19. 
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the source of municipalities' legislative authority in respect of the environment. He 
relied primarily on s 156(1)(b) (allowing for national or provincial legislation to 
assign any matter to municipalities) and s 156(4) of the Constitution, which indicates 
that matters reserved for national and provincial legislative authority in Parts A of 
Schedules 4 and 5 must be assigned to a municipality (by agreement and subject to 
conditions) if the matter necessarily relates to local government, would be 
administered most effectively locally, and the municipality has the capacity to 
administer it. Whilst not identifying, at this point, the exact assignment in terms of 
which municipalities may be exercising legislative authority in respect of the 
"environment", Gyanda J preliminarily situated this power within the ambit of s 
156(1)(b) by noting that: 
although matters relating to the environment may be said, in terms of the 
Constitution, to be the primary concern or sphere of National and Provincial 
responsibility … Local governments in the form of Municipalities are in the best 
position to know, understand and deal with issues involving the environment at 
local level.34 
Prefacing his arguments relating to the model of co-operative government 
established by the Constitution, he pointed out that the framers of the Constitution 
had not intended to allocate the functional areas in the constitutional schedules in 
terms of "hermetically sealed, distinct and water tight compartments".35 The 
Constitution has a unitarian focus in establishing the Republic of South Africa as 
"one, sovereign democratic state"36 while at the same time constituting national, 
provincial and local spheres of government. The capacity for the local sphere to 
exercise legislative authority within this model is confirmed by s 43 of the 
Constitution, which vests such authority in municipal councils. 
Highlighting a source of legislative authority apart from assignment, he also pointed 
to s 156(5) of the Constitution, which states that a municipality has a right to 
34  Le Sueur (KZP) para 20.  
35  Le Sueur (KZP) para 20.  
36  S 1 of the Constitution. 
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exercise any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or incidental, to 
the effective performance of its functions.37 
2.2.3 Model of co-operative government  
The third pillar of the judge's reasoning was centered on the concept of co-operative 
government. Quoting liberally from the Gauteng Development Tribunal (CC) and 
Maccsand (CC) cases, in addition to the Constitutional Court's decision in Wary 
Holdings38, Gyanda J laid emphasis upon multiple areas of control and overlapping 
powers. Echoing the Constitutional Court, the judge pointed out that the functional 
areas in Schedules 4 and 5 are allocated to the three spheres on the basis of what 
was considered appropriate to each sphere. These areas are not contained in 
hermetically sealed compartments. Overlaps of power are not impermissible and do 
not constitute an illegal veto of the powers of one sphere by another. When this 
occurred the government agencies involved needed to co-operate and coordinate 
their actions with one another. However, the functional areas remain distinct from 
one another on the basis of the perspective from or level at which a power is 
exercised, even when a similar wording was employed.39 The environment, Gyanda J 
held, was an "ideal example" of an area of legislative and executive authority that 
had to reside in all three spheres of government and that accordingly had to be 
inserted into Part A of Schedule 4.40 
2.2.4 Meaning of "municipal planning" 
Moving to the core of his judgment, Gyanda J then focused on the meaning of 
"municipal planning" and its relationship to the "environment", summarising his 
thesis thus: "Municipalities under the banner of "municipal planning" have historically 
37  Le Sueur (KZP) para 20.  
38  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 337 (CC). 
39  Le Sueur (KZP) para 20.  
40  Le Sueur (KZP) para 20. What Gyanda J seems to imply in this passage is that the logic imposed 
by the division between an A and B part in the Schedules did not comfortably accommodate the 
environment, which was functionally appropriate to allocate to all three spheres. Inserting 
"environment" into Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5 would have been unduly restrictive if 
"environment" was then interpreted – in a fashion similar to "municipal planning" – as an area 
reserved to the municipal sphere (albeit with the possibility of national and provincial legislative 
oversight). 
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always exercised legislative responsibility over environmental affairs within a 
municipal area. The drafters of the Constitution were aware of this fact and 
recognised this "… in the manner in which the newer Constitutional dispensation was 
formulated."41 Both at the time that the Constitution was drafted, and since then, the 
judge continued, national and provincial legislation and policies have allocated to 
municipalities a legislative and executive mandate with respect to environmental 
matters, "placing such matters squarely within the concept of municipal planning".42 
As evidence for this position, Gyanda J pointed to the manner in which the Local 
Government Transition Act43 defined the powers of transitional metropolitan councils 
(which powers extended to "metropolitan environment conservation") and later, the 
powers of metropolitan councils and metropolitan local councils (which extended to 
"the co-ordination of environmental affairs" and "the management and control of 
environmental affairs" respectively). Councils were required to exercise these powers 
through the development and implementation of an integrated development plan, 
which had to be mindful of the land development principles articulated in the 
Development Facilitation Act.44 The latter required policy, administrative practice and 
laws to promote "sustained protection of the environment".45 Gyanda J saw in these 
provisions a "specific environmental mandate" on the part of municipalities at the 
time when the Constitution was enacted in February 1997.46 The framers of the 
Constitution must accordingly "be taken to have been aware of the fact that the 
matters for which [m]unicipalities would be responsible, involved environmental 
considerations".47 
Since then, the Municipal Systems Act48 had extended the environmental role of 
municipalities, requiring that their integrated development planning contribute to the 
progressive realization of the fundamental rights in s 24 of the Constitution. The 
41  Le Sueur (KZP) para 21. 
42  Le Sueur (KZP) para 22 (my emphasis). 
43  Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993. 
44  Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. 
45  Le Sueur (KZP) para 22. 
46  Le Sueur (KZP) para 23.  
47  Le Sueur (KZP) para 23. 
48  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (MSA). 
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careful balancing that the MSA effects between national, provincial and local powers 
rests upon the requirement that integrated development plans (which always include 
a spatial development framework) must be compatible with national and provincial 
development plans and planning requirements binding upon the municipality in 
terms of legislation.49 The applicant had not disputed that the D-MOSS amendments 
were introduced consistently with the municipality's integrated development plan, 
nor had it suggested that the provisions of the D-MOSS conflicted with any relevant 
national or provincial legislation or policies.50 
Turning to the Town Planning Ordinance, as the specific legislative instrument used 
by the municipality to effect the D-MOSS amendments to the Ethekwini Town 
Planning Scheme, Gyanda J noted that the matters to be dealt with by schemes 
included "[t]he preservation or conservation of … places of natural interest or 
beauty".51 Further, the courts had recognised the zoning of land for conservation 
purposes introduced by town planning schemes as imposing a legally enforceable 
encumbrance.52 This additionally supported the conclusion that prior to the 
Constitution "municipal planning" involved the power to regulate land use while 
taking into account, amongst other factors, the need to protect the natural 
environment.53 
2.2.5 National and provincial support for localised environmental governance 
As a final support for the cogency of his argument, Gyanda J presented evidence of 
national and provincial support for local environmental governance as an aspect of 
municipal planning. 
He first emphasised that none of the respondents (particularly those that had 
indicated their intention to abide by the decision of the court) supported the 
applicant's contention that the municipality's "transgression" into the field of 
49  Le Sueur para 25. 
50  Le Sueur para 27. 
51  Le Sueur para 31. 
52  Le Sueur para 31. Gyanda J mentions specifically in this regard the judgments in Port Edward 
Town Board v Kay 1996 3 SA 664 (AD) and Hangklip Environmental Action Group v MEC 
Environmental Affairs 2007 6 SA 65 (C). 
53  Le Sueur para 33. 
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environmental law-making by way of the enactment of the D-MOSS amendments 
was unconstitutional and unlawful. Neither the Minister of Environmental Affairs, nor 
the MEC: Agricultural and Environmental Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal nor the MEC: Co-
operative Governance, KwaZulu-Natal, had contradicted the municipality's view or 
standpoint.54 There was, on the contrary, evidence to show that local government 
plays an integral role in the overall scheme of environmental management in South 
Africa. In this regard Gyanda J highlighted: 
• The KwaZulu-Natal Environmental Implementation Plan, which lists "municipal 
planning" as a functional area of competence with environmental relevance.55 
• The NEMA Environmental Management Framework Regulations of 2010, which 
state that spatial development frameworks must, inter alia, inform conservation 
of both the natural and built environment, indicate areas in which particular types 
of land use should be encouraged and others discouraged, and indicate areas in 
which the intensity of land development could be either increased or reduced.56  
• The National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004, which 
requires co-ordination and alignment of biodiversity plans with integrated 
development plans adopted by municipalities.57  
• The National Biodiversity Framework, which, whilst recognising that 
municipalities do not have biodiversity conservation as their core business, 
ascribes a key role to the local sphere in terms of co-ordinating and integrating 
the management of biodiversity resources.58 
Gyanda J was thus able to conclude that (i) municipalities had traditionally been 
involved in regulating matters at an environmental level; (ii) that their functions at 
this level had been recognised by the drafters of the Constitution and (iii) that 
national and provincial environmental legislation recognized the part to be played by 
54  Le Sueur para 29. 
55  Le Sueur para 35. 
56  Le Sueur para 36. 
57  Le Sueur para 38. 
58  Le Sueur para 38. 
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the local sphere in managing and controlling the environment. As such it was 
inconceivable that municipalities were to be excluded from legislating in respect of 
environmental matters, notwithstanding the listing of "environment" in Part A of 
Schedule 4.59 
3 Discussion  
The discussion in this note focuses on two questions: Is this judgment consistent 
with recent Constitutional Court jurisprudence on municipal planning? And secondly, 
is the court's affirmation of local environmental governance a welcome 
development?  
3.1 Consistency w ith jurisprudence on municipal planning 
This section focuses on the Le Sueur judgment's consistency with the Constitutional 
Court's earlier pronouncements in Gauteng Development Tribunal and Maccsand.60 
59  Le Sueur para 39. 
60  Although this is the function of this section, it should be noted that this court had already 
examined the obligations of town planning and provincial environmental authorities in Fuel 
Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 6 SA 4 
(CC) (Fuel Retailers). In Fuel Retailers the court rejected the argument that consideration of the 
social and economic aspects of a development were reserved for consideration by the local 
authority (under the mantle of "need and desirability" when determining applications for 
rezoning), while the provincial authorities were restricted to a consideration of environmental 
impacts. Rejecting this compartmentalized vision of the allocation of functional powers, which 
would have excluded the provincial sphere from examining social and economic impacts from the 
vantage point of their impact upon and relationship with environmental impacts, the court 
decided that the local authority's consideration of "need and desirability" could not be equated 
with the province's consideration of the social, economic and environmental impacts of a 
proposed development in terms of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
(para 85). As such, the court affirmed a complex, interconnected and layered understanding of 
the functional areas vesting in the different spheres of government. There is one paragraph in 
the Fuel Retailers judgment, however, that could lend support to the applicants' argument that 
environmental considerations are reserved to the national and provincial spheres. For the court 
had held: "Need and desirability are factors that must be considered by the local authority in 
terms of the Ordinance. …The local authority is not required to consider the social, economic and 
environmental impact of a proposed development as the environmental authorities are required 
to do by the provisions of NEMA" (my emphasis). In my view, however, it is unlikely that by this 
statement the court intended to exclude local authorities from exercising legislative and 
executive authority over the environment as an incident of municipal planning. Firstly, the 
environmental competence of the local authority was not at issue in this case. Secondly, as the 
Constitutional Court noted, in both the decisions in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
it had been held that the local authority had to consider need, desirability and sustainability 
when making a rezoning decision (paras 25 and 27). The Constitutional Court did not dispute 
this or expressly state that local authorities do not have a mandate to consider issues of 
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In the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, which dealt with the constitutionality of 
the Development Facilitation Act's61 empowerment of provincial development 
tribunals to make land development decisions in parallel with local authorities, the 
meaning of the term "municipal planning" became more settled after both the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court held that it incorporates the 
regulation of land use, and not simply "forward planning" as some had maintained. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal62 pointed out that the principal tool 
for regulating land use is through the introduction and enforcement of a town 
planning scheme, and noted that the provincial land use planning ordinance in 
question allowed local authorities to prepare a town-planning scheme for all or any 
land within its municipal area, and thereafter to amend, extend and substitute the 
scheme.63 Commenting later on the structure of government authority under the 
present constitutional dispensation, the Supreme Court of Appeal remarked that 
original constitutional powers are conferred directly upon the lower tiers of 
government, with the implication that no other body or person may be vested with 
such powers.64 Linking this notion of original constitutional power with the provisions 
of s 156(1) of the Constitution, the court remarked that it was apparent that while 
national and provincial government may legislate in respect of the functional areas in 
Schedule 4, including the areas listed in Part B, "the executive authority over, and 
administration of those functional areas is constitutionally reserved to municipalities" 
(my emphasis).65 The Constitutional Court, in similar vein, confirmed that municipal 
planning refers to the control and regulation of the use of land,66 and that municipal 
planning is an original constitutional power conferred on municipalities in terms of s 
environmental sustainability. Finally, it would be strange for the court to endorse a layered, 
polycentric approach to the issue of need and desirability/socio-economic factors and not, at the 
same time, allow room for a similarly layered approach to be followed in respect of issues of 
environmental sustainability. Given this, the Le Sueur judgment appears to be consistent with 
the Constitutional Court's reasoning in Fuel Retailers. 
61  Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995.  
62  Johannesburg Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 2 SA 554 (SCA) (henceforth 
"Gauteng Development Tribunal (SCA)"). 
63  Gauteng Development Tribunal (SCA) para 6. 
64  Gauteng Development Tribunal (SCA) para 24. 
65  Gauteng Development Tribunal (SCA) para 28. 
66  Gauteng Development Tribunal (CC) para 57.  
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156(1).67 These decisions accordingly associate the distinctiveness of municipal 
planning as an original constitutional power reserved to the local sphere with 
executive authority, and this executive authority extends to both the 
preparation/introduction of a town planning scheme, as well as the subsequent 
enforcement, amendment, extension and substitution thereof. 
The issue in Gauteng Development Tribunal focused on what is a fairly unambiguous 
executive power – the authority to rezone land or to establish townships or "land 
development areas". The issue of rezoning was also central to the Maccsand case, 
but here the question was whether legislation governing and mandating municipal 
planning could apply alongside national legislation. This case was thus 
simultaneously about executive authority (the municipality's) and legislative authority 
(the province's) and the possibility of both co-existing with the exclusive national 
competence to regulate mining. In contrast with the Gauteng Development Tribunal 
case where the court was at pains to underscore the distinctiveness of municipal 
planning and its reservation to the local sphere to the exclusion of the provincial 
sphere (as an executive authority), the Maccsand case allowed the court to 
emphasize municipal planning as an overlapping power, manifesting as both 
executive and legislative authority. The legislative authority of the municipality in 
respect of municipal planning, much less environment, was not at issue, however. 
In the light of this context (municipal planning as an original constitutional power 
manifesting as executive authority) what are we to make of Gyanda J's holding that 
municipalities are authorised to legislate on environmental matters?68 
Bronstein explores this apparent anomaly in her recent critique of the Le Sueur 
case.69 Tracking the uneasy characterisation of town planning schemes in South 
African law70 and commentary, and referencing a string of authorities in the United 
States of America, she argues that town planning schemes, zoning schemes, land 
67  Gauteng Development Tribunal (CC) para 45. 
68  Le Sueur (KZP) para 40. 
69  Bronstein 2014 SALJ. I am grateful to Professor Bronstein for making the final draft of this article 
available to me. 
70  According to Van Wyk there is no unanimity on the topic of the classification of a town planning 
scheme. See Van Wyk "Planning Law" para 58.  
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use planning schemes, spatial development plans and the like are legislative in 
character. In this she relies on Van Wyk's classification of municipal planning into the 
elements of (i) spatial planning, being tools or instruments used to determine 
specific types of land uses such as integrated development plans, spatial 
development frameworks, and town planning or land use schemes;71 (ii) land use 
management, which comprises procedures to amend land use where developments 
others than those proposed in the original plan are proposed;72 and (iii) land 
development management, which concerns procedures to facilitate development on 
land that has been zoned or rezoned, such as township establishment, subdivision or 
waiver of building regulations.73 While the second and third of these categories lie in 
the "heartland" of municipal planning,74 the spatial planning instruments 
contemplated in Van Wyk's first category, Bronstein argues, are legislative in 
character.75 Citing Van Wyk and a line of North American authorities, she highlights 
the following salient features of town planning schemes in particular: their 
impersonal application to members of a particular community; promulgation and the 
need for notices and formalities to bring them into force; their implementation of 
policy in the public interest, prospective operation, and continuation in force for an 
indefinite period;76 the fact that town planning schemes can be amended by the 
bodies that creates them (i.e. the author of the town planning scheme is not functus 
officio after the promulgation of the scheme);77 and their capacity to affect multiple 
unrelated properties based on a policy principle.78 
The reason this characterization matters, Bronstein holds, is that legislative decisions 
are treated more deferentially than administrative decisions by the courts (at least in 
the United States of America), and are thus more effectively insulated from judicial 
71  Van Wyk Planning Law 128-129. 
72  Van Wyk Planning Law 131.  
73  Van Wyk Planning Law 132. 
74  Bronstein points out that the illustrative examples of land use planning decisions discussed in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in the Gauteng Development Tribunal matter dealt with 
rezoning or township establishment applications, falling within Van Wyk's second and third 
categories (Bronstein 2014 SALJ 15).  
75  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 24.  
76  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 15. 
77  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 16. 
78  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 26.  
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review.79 She also voices a concern for the "democratic guarantees" legislative 
processes afford.80 She agrees with Gyanda J that the D-MOSS amendments are 
legislative in character, which means, however, that the power to pass such 
legislation has to be based in legislative assignment (s 156(1)(b) of the 
Constitution).81 The main weakness of the Le Sueur case, she argues, is that there 
was no attempt on the part of the court to analyse the "origin and pedigree" of the 
legislative power exercised in bringing the D-MOSS amendments into force.82 None 
of the legislation cited (including the NEMA and the NEMBA) indicate that the power 
to make the D-MOSS amendments was validly assigned to the municipality.83 
The characterization of the D-MOSS amendments as the outcome of the exercise of 
legislative authority may well matter for the reasons Bronstein identifies.84 A closer 
reading of the ambit of municipal, provincial and national legislative power should, 
however, dispel any disquiet in this regard as well as dismiss the argument that the 
environmental aspects of town-planning schemes should be based in legislative 
assignment. This requires an understanding of the scope of municipal legislative 
power, and the distinctions between original, assigned and delegated powers. 
Bronstein proposes but then dismisses ss 156(2)85 and 156(5)86 of the Constitution 
as the sources of municipal legislative authority over "municipal planning". 
Interpreting s 156(2), Bronstein aligns herself with the commentators who view a 
municipality's by-law making power in very restricted terms, as being necessarily 
79  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 21.  
80  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 27. 
81  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 27. 
82  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 28. 
83  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 28.  
84  Apart from the division of powers between national/provincial and local spheres of government, 
the proper characterisation of town planning schemes could be significant for the argument 
(raised but not considered in the judgment) that the amendments constitute "expropriation by 
stealth" (Le Sueur (KZP) para 17). The D-MOSS amendments, or municipal planning instruments 
of a similar nature, could be vulnerable to the claim that they constitute an unconstitutional 
deprivation or expropriation of property. Constitutionality in both instances requires, after all, the 
existence of a "law of general application" (s 25, Constitution). If large-scale amendments to 
town-planning schemes in the nature of the D-MOSS amendments are characterised as executive 
authority then they would surely fall foul of the constitutional property right. 
85  According to 156(2), "[a] municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective 
administration of the matters which it has the right to administer". 
86  S 156(5) provides: "A municipality has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter 
reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of its functions". 
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confined to the "effective administration of the matters which it has the right to 
administer".87 An alternative interpretation (acknowledged by Bronstein88) is that 
municipal by-law making power should not be regarded as subservient and 
instrumental to its administrative role. Steytler and Visser espouse this view, 
grounding it in the unequivocal recognition – both in the Constitution89 and by the 
courts – that the constitutional status of a municipality is materially different from 
what it was when Parliament reigned supreme.90 In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,91 for instance, the 
Constitutional Court held that a municipal council is a deliberative legislative 
assembly with legislative and executive powers recognised in the Constitution itself.92 
This underlines the importance of original constitutional powers, which as the 
Constitutional Court in both Gauteng Development Tribunal and Maccsand 
confirmed, includes municipal planning. In City of Cape Town v Robertson93 the 
Constitutional Court held that original powers are not dependent on enabling 
national legislation.94 If this is the case, how would the breadth and depth of original 
powers be exercised if municipal by-law making powers were necessarily restricted 
to matters of "effective administration"? 
Could s 156(2) serve as the source of a municipality's legislative authority in respect 
of environmental matters? Rejecting this possibility, Bronstein cites the recent 
Supreme Court of Appeal decision in JDJ Properties CC v Umngeni Local 
Municipality,95 in which the court had occasion to deliberate upon the legal nature of 
a town planning scheme (interestingly, in the context of a particular scheme passed 
87  Bronstein cites as authority in this regard the LLM thesis of A E Nortje (Nortje Local 
Government's Executive Authority) and the obiter dictum of Yacoob J in Swartbooi v Brink 2006 
1 SA 203 (CC); see Bronstein 2014 SALJ 5-6. 
88  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 7. 
89  Key provisions in this regard include ss 151(3) and 151(4) of the Constitution, as discussed 
further below.   
90  Steytler and De Visser "Local Government" 43.  
91  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 1 SA 
374 (CC) (henceforth "Fedsure (CC)").  
92  Fedsure (CC) para 26. 
93  City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005 2 SA 323 (CC) (henceforth "Robertson (CC)"). 
94  Robertson (CC) para 60.  
95  JDJ Properties CC v Umngeni Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 395 (SCA) (henceforth "JDJ Properties 
(SCA)"). This particular aspect of the judgment was concerned with whether or not the 
appellants had exhausted all internal remedies in a dispute with the municipality in terms of s 
9(1)(c) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977.  
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in terms of the same provincial ordinance as that used to effect the D-MOSS 
amendments). After describing the process for the approval of a town planning 
scheme, the court concluded that "although it is a legislative instrument (on account 
of its general application), it is not a regulation made by the MEC and it is also not a 
bylaw passed by the municipality".96 The true character of a town planning scheme, 
the court continued, is that "[i]t is a hybrid form of legislation created by resolution 
in the local sphere of government, and approval and promulgation in the provincial 
sphere of government, with a public-participation process sandwiched between the 
two".97 This accords with Davis J's contention in Van der Westhuizen v Butler98 that 
zoning scheme regulations are not sourced in a bylaw.99 
These precedents would seem to dispense with s 156(2) as a candidate for the 
legislative authority in question. It also quashes the argument that a municipality's 
legislative authority in respect of environmental matters is embedded in its executive 
authority over municipal planning;100 i.e. for a town planning scheme to be viewed as 
a form of subordinate legislation. 
Are we forced then to conclude that the power to pass an instrument such as the D-
MOSS amendments must be based in legislative assignment? If this is so, then it is 
because the power to undertake municipal planning must be based on legislative 
assignment. It is here that this argument goes off track and where the decision in Le 
Sueur is also arguably over-stated. The precedent established by Gyanda J's 
reasoning is not so much that municipalities are authorised to legislate on 
environmental matters, but that they are authorised to do so as an incident of 
municipal planning, an original constitutional power. 
An assigned power is not the same as an original constitutional power.101 Steytler 
and De Visser make this clear when they state that the local government affairs of a 
96  JDJ Properties (SCA) para 49.  
97  JDJ Properties (SCA) para 49.  
98  Van der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 6 SA 174 (C) (henceforth "Van der Westhuizen (C)").  
99  Van der Westhuizen (C) 187G-H.  
100  Steytler and De Visser point out that executive authority includes the power to enact subordinate 
legislation. See Steytler and De Visser "Local Government" 52. 
101  An assigned function is also not the same as a delegated function. As Steytler and De Visser 
point out, an assignment contemplates a taking over of power, entailing the complete transfer of 
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community embrace both original and assigned functions, and that the subsidiarity 
principle articulated in s 156(4) applies only to Schedule 4A and 5A functional 
areas.102 The non-core nature of assigned functions is underlined by the statutory 
requirements relating to the assignment of functions or powers to municipalities 
generally103 or to municipalities in particular.104 These assignment procedures 
obviously find no application to the functional area of municipal planning. 
The nature of national and provincial legislative power in respect of original and 
assigned functions also differs. In particular, national and provincial power over 
original municipal constitutional powers must be read in the light of s 151(3)105 and 
151(4)106 of the Constitution. These provisions ground the claim that national and 
provincial legislative authority over Schedules 4B and 5B are in fact not held 
"concurrently" with local government, because they are constrained.107 Although 
there are subtle differences between the scope of national and provincial powers in 
this regard, in general they are constrained by the mandate of framing the 
governance of municipal functions, and not of determining the detail of those 
functions.108 The Supreme Court of Appeal has confirmed this understanding in CDA 
Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality109 when it 
rejected the requirement that a municipality obtain the Premier's approval for the 
imposition of property rates, required in terms of the Cape Ordinance 20 of 1974. 
More recently, in Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Government, etc, 
Western Cape110 Davis J held that the provincial government exercises its legislative 
final decision-making power in individual matters. A delegated function allows for the final say in 
individual matters to be left to the national or provincial government. See Steytler and De Visser 
"Local Government" 59. 
102  Steytler and De Visser "Local Government" 59-60.  
103  Governed by s 9 of MSA. 
104  Governed by s 10 of MSA. 
105  S 151(3) of the Constitution provides that "[a] municipality has the right to govern, on its own 
initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial 
legislation, as provided for in the Constitution". 
106  S 151(4) provides that "[t]he national or a provincial government may not compromise or 
impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions". 
107  Steytler and De Visser "Local Government" 50. 
108  Steytler and De Visser "Local Government" 50ff. 
109  CDA Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2007 4 SA 276 (SCA) 
110  Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Government, etc, Western Cape 2013 6 SA 113 
(WCC) (henceforth "Habitat Council (WCC)"). This case dealt with the constitutionality of s 44 of 
the (Cape) Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985.  
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and executive authority in a manner that regulates or "broadly" manages or controls 
the exercise of municipal planning by municipalities rather than through a direct 
authorisation function.111 This is an approach, Davis J held, that ensures provincial 
authority is not destructive of or conflated with municipal powers.112 
It is therefore inaccurate to claim that "[l]egislative assignment is an important 
source of municipal legislative power in the area of 'municipal planning'".113 Since the 
national and provincial spheres of government exercise only a framing legislative 
authority over the functional area of municipal planning, it would be impossible for 
them to assign the legislative authority for determining the detailed arrangements in 
this regard to the municipal sphere. 
If the enactment and amendment of town planning schemes is then a "hybrid form 
of legislation" that is neither an exercise of executive authority (as subordinate 
legislation), nor a bylaw, the obvious candidate for the source of municipal 
legislative authority in this regard is s 156(5) of the Constitution.114 The "incidental 
power doctrine"115 that this provision invokes was applied in the case of Ex Parte, 
Western Cape Provincial Government: In re: DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West 
Provincial Government,116 in which the court held that the exercise of incidental 
powers is constitutionally acceptable if the legislative provisions are inextricably 
linked and foundational to powers allocated in terms of the Constitution. As this case 
demonstrates, incidental powers may include legislative powers.117 Steytler and De 
Visser argue that s 156(5) requires a purposive approach to interpreting local 
government power that (i) should be linked to local government's developmental 
111  Habitat Council (WCC) 122C-E.  
112  Habitat Council (WCC) 122F. 
113  Bronstein 2014 SALJ 8-9. A further statement illustrative of a conflation of original and delegated 
functions reads: "The power to make and administer town planning schemes was typically 
delegated to municipalities by provincial ordinances. The power to make spatial development 
plans has also been delegated to municipalities by the national legislature in terms of the 
Municipal Systems Act" (Bronstein 2014 SALJ 6).  
114  Bronstein states that there appears to be "no prospect" for this provision's grounding the kind of 
legislative powers exercised in the Le Sueur case, but her reasons for dismissing this source of 
authority are not clear. See Bronstein 2014 SALJ 20. 
115  Steytler and De Visser "Local Government" 48. 
116  Ex Parte, Western Cape Provincial Government: In re: DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West 
Provincial Government 2001 1 SA 500 (CC). 
117  Steytler and De Visser "Local Government 48. 
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mandate and (ii) should not increase the functional ambit of local government but 
rather enhance the efficacy of an existing functional area.118 It is difficult to see how 
the legislative authority to enact a town planning scheme (including its 
environmental aspects) could not be seen as "necessary for" or "incidental to" 
developmentally-oriented planning, given that the courts in the Gauteng 
Development Tribunal have now confirmed that municipal planning includes land use 
control. This incidental power does not increase the functional ambit of local 
government but rather enables it to conduct municipal planning effectively. As the 
court in JDJ Properties remarked, this legislative authority is sui generis, involving a 
hybrid allocation of power between the local and provincial spheres, but not in a 
manner that denudes municipalities of all legislative authority whatsoever. 
This interpretation of the source of municipal legislative authority in respect of 
municipal planning, and by extension, to environmental matters as an incidence of 
municipal planning, does throw up some unevenness in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court's decisions in Gauteng Development Tribunal 
and Maccsand, but only to the extent that executive authority in respect of municipal 
planning is assumed to include the introduction and amendment of a town-planning 
scheme119 – a position that does not accord with the decision in JDJ Properties. An 
interpretation that locates municipal legislative authority for the introduction and 
amendment of a town planning scheme in s 156(5) of the Constitution is in line with 
the latter decision and also solves the potential problem of non-compliance with the 
constitutional property clause. Town planning schemes are clearly laws of general 
application, enacted on the basis of a municipality's power to exercise any power 
necessary for or incidental to the effective performance of municipal planning as an 
original constitutional power. It is only in this sense, therefore, that municipalities 
have authority to legislate on environmental matters. 
This conclusion does mean that Gyanda J was wrong to locate the source of 
municipal legislative authority in respect of environmental matters in ss 156(1)(b) 
118  Steytler and De Visser "Local Government" 48. 
119  Other aspects of municipal planning, the decision to rezone areas of land or establish townships, 
for instance, would remain "executive" in nature.  
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and 156(4) of the Constitution, as these provisions relate to assigned powers, not 
original constitutional powers. However, it does not preclude the possibility of 
national and provincial government assigning legislative and executive authority for 
the functional area of the environment to the municipal sphere. The object of the 
local sphere's powers in this instance would not be limited to the consideration of 
the environment as an incident of municipal planning. Possible examples of such 
powers could include legislative and executive authority over environmental impact 
assessments, or the development of bylaws on the treatment of acidic mine water, 
for instance. 
3.2 Justifying local environmental governance  
Is Gyanda J's affirmation of environmental governance as an incidence of municipal 
planning a welcome development? The notion of local environmental governance is 
hardly a new concept, both internationally and nationally. At an international level, 
the importance of regional and local actors in environmental governance in the 
European Union is well known.120 Richardson, however, has highlighted the 
importance of local environmental governance regimes in postcolonial societies, 
although he stresses the importance of such regimes' being coordinated with 
institutions at national and global levels.121 Closer to home, Du Plessis has been a 
leading proponent of the concept of "local environmental governance" and for local 
government's role in realizing the constitutional environmental right.122 Although not 
cited in the judgment, Du Plessis had already observed a few years ago that local 
government is co-responsible, together with national and provincial government, for 
the realization of section 24 of the Constitution.123 Like others, Du Plessis justifies 
local environmental governance on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, which 
encapsulates the idea that functions must be allocated to the level of government at 
which they will be most effectively executed and fulfilled.124 The subsidiary nature of 
governance, as Beabout points out, actually applies to the higher or central levels of 
120  See for instance Longo 2011 U Tas LR. 
121  Richardson 2000 Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y. 
122  Du Plessis 2010 Stell LR. 
123  Du Plessis 2010 Stell LR 266. 
124  Du Plessis 2010 Stell LR 265. 
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government since the principle constrains their authority to those tasks that cannot 
be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level.125 The principle of 
subsidiarity therefore accommodates the notion of overlapping centres of power in 
respect of particular functions of government, although its conceptual richness may 
be hampered by the focus on "effectiveness". 
This note concludes by proposing that the notion of social-ecological resilience 
serves as an alternative conceptual frame for justifying local environmental 
governance.126 
3.2.1 The theory of social-ecological resilience  
The theory of social-ecological resilience has been developed in response to the 
need for understanding how linked social-ecological systems operate under 
conditions of complexity. With its roots in the work of ecologist C.S. Holling during 
the 1970s, resilience theory reflects a paradigm shift in ecology, natural resources 
management and environmental law away from believing that social-ecological 
systems operate around an equilibrium that can be maintained by "optimizing" the 
use of particular natural resources.127 Instead, there is now an understanding that 
the various elements that constitute social-ecological systems impact upon and 
change each other such that the system can both maintain a steady state (for as 
long as the type of relationships and feedbacks between the various elements are 
maintained) as well as adapt and change over time in response to various 
anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic shocks.128 "Resilience" has thus been defined 
as "the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and still maintain its basic 
structure and function",129 while later definitions have emphasized the capacity of a 
125  Beabout 2008 U St Thomas LJ 211. 
126  For a recent literature review on the relationship between law and resilience, see Humby 2014 
Seattle Environmental Law Journal. 
127  The idea of determining a "total allowable catch" of marine resources on an annual basis is an 
example of this "optimization" philosophy. 
128  An oft-cited example of this is how the natural characteristics of the Florida Everglades are 
changing in response to large-scale water diversions and conversions of marshland to 
agricultural land. An example closer to home is how the natural system of dolomitic springs on 
the Witwatersrand has been irreversibly transformed by more than a century of gold mining into 
a system capable of generating large-scale acid mine drainage.  
129  Walker and Salt Resilience Thinking iii. 
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system to self-organise and the quality of that self-organization as well as the 
degree to which a system can build and increase the capacity for learning and 
adaptation.130 Later theoretical developments in resilience theory have highlighted 
the importance of biodiversity in processes of reorganization and regeneration.131 
While only a small number of species are responsible for keeping an ecosystem 
within a certain "domain of attraction" (ie with the same kind of structure, form and 
feedbacks) at any one time, the existence of species groupings in terms of the 
functions they perform has been highlighted as playing a critical role in how well a 
system is able to reorganise and regenerate after a disturbance.132 This highlights 
redundancy as a valuable attribute in ecosystem functioning. There is also an 
emerging understanding that social-ecological systems operate at different scales 
(local-regional-national-global) and that cross-scale dynamics can affect the rate at 
which different systems adapt and transform over time.133 Change at a local scale 
can frequently drive changes in larger systems, as when the cumulative effect of 
many individual land use changes (from undisturbed natural vegetation to 
agriculture, for instance) drives changes in the manner in which groundwater 
operates in an entire region,134 or affects the turbidity of freshwater lakes. 
New understandings of the complexity of linked social-ecological systems has led to 
the proliferation of new governance models for responding to and dealing with such 
complexity. The concept of "adaptive governance", in particular, has been proposed 
as a form of governance that incorporates the reflexive, iterative and scientifically 
based forms of management necessary to understand the dynamic nature of social 
ecological systems, at the same time as it extends the function of governing to a 
broader range of actors operating on a wider spatial and temporal scale.135 Adaptive 
governance is thus polycentric in nature, extending the ambit of governance not only 
to the private sector, but also to sub-national spheres of governance such as local 
130  Carpenter et al 2001 Ecosystems 765.  
131  Folke 2006 Global Environmental Change 257. 
132  Folke 2006 Global Environmental Change 258. 
133  This insight is connected with the notion of "panarchy" proposed by Gunderson and Holling in 
2002, which for practical reasons cannot be further explored in this note.  
134  See in this regard Walker and Salt Resilience Thinking and their discussion of agriculture in the 
Goulburn-Broken catchment in Australia. 
135  Humby 2014 Seattle Environmental Law Journal 15. 
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government. In her discussion of the aspects of adaptive governance that facilitate 
resilience in social-ecological systems, Cosens highlights for instance, the importance 
of multiple, overlapping levels of control and local capacity-building, amongst 
others.136 
3.2.2 The promise of adaptive governance in South Africa  
The way in which the South African Constitution constitutes local government and 
the manner in which the concept of "municipal planning" has been developed by the 
South African courts of late (including in the Le Sueur case) are remarkably suited to 
these particular aspects of adaptive governance, ie multiple and overlapping levels of 
control that include capacitating local government. The D-MOSS amendments 
themselves fit comfortably within the paradigm of social-ecological resilience, given 
their emphasis upon a systemic protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services 
and thereby the entire social-ecological system that depends on them. The value of 
the resilience frame, as opposed to the principle of subsidiarity, lies in the extended 
range of values that come into play when considering the integrity of a social-
ecological system. Instead of asking which level of government could most 
effectively govern ecosystem function, for instance, one would need to understand 
how the integrity of a social-ecological system extends over multiple scales and what 
different roles and responsibilities different kinds of actors (including different levels 
of government as well as the private sector) have in relation to maintaining that 
system's integrity. This places great emphasis on the values of working together 
(through coordination, the exchange of information, and so on) and continuous 
learning. These values are very much in line with the values of co-operative 
government set out in s 41 of the Constitution. 
If Gyanda J had decided against the municipality in Le Sueur, the decision would 
have significantly strained the potential for adaptive environmental governance in 
South Africa. Fortunately, his decision has strengthened the hand of local 
government, enabling it to rise to the challenge of its co-responsibility for realising 
136  Cosens 2012 Environmental Law 256. 
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section 24. How different local governments respond, and how in particular they are 
able to overcome capacity and resource constraints and the contortions of local 
politics, will require careful observation in the future. 
4 Conclusion  
The precedent in the Le Sueur matter is essentially that municipalities have authority 
to legislate upon environmental matters as an incident of municipal planning, which 
is an original constitutional power. The note has suggested that characterising town 
planning schemes as the exercise of legislative authority is important for purposes of 
meeting the requirements of the constitutional property right but has argued that 
contrary to both the judgment and recent commentary, the source of such legislative 
authority is not based on legislative assignment (invoking ss 156(1)(a) and 156(4) of 
the Constitution), but in s 156(5) – the provision that allows a municipality to 
exercise any power reasonably necessary for or incidental to the effective 
performance of its functions. This argument is based on understanding the 
distinction between original and assigned powers, and the nature of the control that 
the national and provincial spheres exercise over Schedule 4B powers. 
Notwithstanding this inaccuracy in the judgment, it has been argued that the 
precedent is a welcome one that can be justified not only on the basis of the 
principle of subsidiarity, but also in terms of the emerging and increasingly important 
theory of social-ecological resilience.   
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